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Introduction 
“Oil, Islam, and Woman”, written by Michael
L. Ross and published in the American Politi-
cal Science Review, is the latest article that
discusses the gender situation in Arab soci-
eties, albeit from a political economy perspec-
tive.1 Its argument was straightforward. Oil,
not Islam, is the cause of gender inequality in
the Middle East. Oil production reduces the
presence of women in the labor force. Failure
of joining the nonagricultural labor force has
profound and far-reaching social and political
consequences. On the social level ‘it leads to
higher fertility rates, less education for girls,
and less female influence within the family’.
On the political level, women are less likely to
‘exchange information, overcome collective
action problems, mobilize politically, lobby for
expanded rights, and less likely to gain repre-
sentation in government’. 2
Ross developed a statistical model, which he
applied on 169 states, and then argued that
states which are richest in oil (ex. Saudi Ara-
bia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman)
have been the most reluctant to grant women
their suffrage rights, have the fewest women
in their nonagricultural workforce and in parlia-
ments, and have the lowest scores on the
gender rights index. States with little or no oil,
on the other hand, such as Morocco, Tunisia,
Lebanon, Syria, and Djibouti, were the first to
grant women female suffrage and ‘tend to
have more women in the workplace and par-
liament and higher gender rights scores’.3 The
author applied his model on Morocco, Tunisia
(two countries with little oil if any) and Algeria
– a major oil producer – and came to the con-
clusion that differences in their oil wealth can
explain differences in the number of working
women, which in turn can help account for dif-
ferences in the number of women entering
parliament. The assumption is that the high
rates of female labor participation in Morocco
and Tunisia have contributed to each coun-
try’s unusually large and strong gender rights
movements, who in turn pushed for their
rights.4 Ross’s argument that oil not Islam is
the cause of gender inequality in the Middle
East certainly highlights an important eco-
nomic factor that can shed some lights on the
gender situation in the Middle East and North
Africa. But by itself it does not provide enough
substance to explain the causes of the deficit
in women’s empowerment in Arab societies.
Statistical models sometimes miss the context
of individual countries, and fail therefore to
capture the complexity of the issue at hand.
For instance, to say that higher rates of fe-
male labor participation have led to a stronger
women’s movement and therefore better gen-
der conditions in Tunisia is not only an over-
statement – it is not accurate. 
Granting women suffrage rights and modern-
izing the Code of Personal Status (Family Law
called in Tunisia al-Majala) were top-down de-
cisions that were made by the Tunisian Pres-
ident Bourguiba. 
Just like the Turkish President Atatourk, Bour-
guiba was of the mind that a modernization
process in Tunisia can not take place without
changing the status of women, hence these
two decisions. Women groups were not in-
cluded in the decision making process. As a
matter of fact, these reforms were launched
at the time of independence in the absence of
a feminist grassroots mass movement. Pres-
ident Bourguiba himself made that point clear
in an interview when he said:
”Indeed, there was no feminist move-
ment demanding the promulgation of a
Code of Personal Status or the aboli-
tion of polygamy.”5
The same can be said about women’s level of
participation in the Moroccan parliament. If the
absence of oil production is an explanatory
factor, then one would have assumed that
women’s level of participation would have
been constantly high since gaining suffrage
rights in 1962. In fact, as the table  shows,
only in 1993 did two women gain access to
the legislator compromising 0.66% of the total
number of deputies. The King’s decision in
2002 to reserve a quota for women in the Par-
liament led to the skyrocketing rise of this rate
to 10.77% in the 2002 legislative elections.6
1 Ross, Michael L.,“Oil, Islam, and Women”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 1, (Feb. 2008). 
2 Ibid., p. 108. 
3 Ibid., p. 116. 
4 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
5 Quoted in Charrad, Mounira M., States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2001, 219. 
6 Tahri, Rachida, “Women’s Political Participation: The Case of Morocco”, A paper presented at the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)/Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)/Southern African Development Community (SADC) Par-
liamentary Forum Conference, Pretoria, South Africa, 11–12 November 2003.
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Table: Morocco’s Women candidates versus women elected
in various legislative elections
Source: Tahri, Rachida, “Women’s Political Participation: The
Case of Morocco”, A paper presented at the International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)/Electoral Institute
of Southern Africa (EISA)/Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) Parliamentary Forum Conference, Pretoria, South
Africa, 11–12 November 2003.
In short, Ross argument has its limits once we
look closer at the individual contexts of these
countries. Even in a country like Saudi Arabia,
the oil production’s argument does not fit en-
tirely. How do we explain for instance that
while Saudi Arabia has one of the lowest
women’s participation in the labor force in the
Arab world (4% if female citizens were only
counted), it has a higher literacy rate (esti-
mated at 69%) than Morocco (39%– figures
of 2004)? 
And how do we explain that Saudi level of par-
ticipation in the labor force was lower in the
decades 1980 (8%) and 1990 (11%) -
decades when the country experienced a se-
vere economic crisis and recession - but in-
creased in 2004 to 15% when oil prices
started to rise?7
Oil production may give higher incentives for
women to stay at home, or help their male re-
latives to insist that they do not work, as Ross
correctly argued, but its explanatory value
ceased to be relevant during the times of eco-
nomic hardship, for Saudi women still re-
mained unable to participate in higher rates in
the labor market at a time when their educa-
tional attainment continued to increase. Oil
production alone, in the opinion of this re-
searcher, is not enough to explain the dire
conditions of women’s rights in Arab states.
The Islamic/religious provisions regulating
women’s lives, on the other hand, are very
much part of the problem. All Arab societies,
with the exception of Tunisia, and to a lesser
extent Morocco, resort to religious stipulations
in the regulation of family laws – namely in the
regulation of the private sphere of family.
These provisions are not gender friendly. The
Arab Human Development Report of 2005,
entitled “Towards the Rise of Women in the
Arab World”, written by Arab experts and de-
dicated to the deficiency of women’s empow-
erment in the region, made that point clear
when it specifically signaled religious family
laws (called Personal Status Laws) as part of
the problem complicating the situation of
women. The report argued that:
“If legally sanctioned discrimination
means disparity in the rule of law in
spite of the presumed equality in legal
status of citizens, then Arab personal
status laws, (…), are witness to legally
sanctioned gender bias. This stems
from the fact that personal status
statutes are primarily derived from the-
ological interpretations and judgement.
The latter originate in the remote past
when gender discrimination permeated
society (…)”.8
Notice that the report deliberately used the
term theological interpretations rather than Is-
lamic provisions when talking about the stipu-
lations that regulate family laws in Arab states.
The reason is striking. In Arab countries with
religious minorities, such as Copts in Egypt
and Orthodox Christians in Syria, family laws
governing the private spheres of these minori-
ties were left to the arbitrations and terms of
their respective Churches. 
The question, therefore, is not whether reli-
gious provisions cause gender inequality in
the Middle East and North Africa. Simply said,
they do discriminate against women. Rather,
why is religion relevant in the regulation of the
family’s sphere? The question has been the
focus of this researcher’s Habilitation/post-
doctoral thesis’s project, which bases its ar-
gument on field works conducted between
2006 and 2008 in three Arab countries -
Kuwait, Syria, and Yemen.
The project suggests a state-society approach
to the issue of women’s rights in Arab soci-
eties, argues that the question of why religion
is still relevant in the regulation of family laws
may be resolved once we focus on the Arab
state itself, its stage of development, power
base, and features; and proposes a definition
of the Arab state which highlights its ‘transi-
tional’ character, where a group of political
elites came to power for various reasons but
were able to hold to power by depending on
7 Saudi Arabia: Summary Gender Profile, The World Bank Group: GenderStats – Database Gender Statistics, http://genderstats.world-
bank.org/home.asp (accessed 13.06.08); Morocco: Summary Gender Profile, The World Bank Group: GenderStats – Database Gender
Statistics, http://genderstats.worldbank.org/home.asp (accessed 13.06.08)
8 Arab Human Development Report “Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World“, United Nations Development Programme, New York,
2006, p. 189.
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1977 1984 1993 1997 2002
Number of
female
candidates
8 16 36 87 967
Number of
women
elected
0 0 2 2 35
Percentage 0 0 0,66 0,66 10,77
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their ’tribal’, ‘regional’, ‘sectarian’, or/and
‘cliental’ bases. It holds to the opinion that 
because this group of political elites lacks 
‘legi-timacy’ and is very much aware of this
fact, it has continuously engaged in the ‘poli-
tics of survival’, shifting alliances with and al-
locating and channeling resources to various
political and social groups to ensure its hold
on power. As such, the Arab state is still in a
‘phase’ where it is neither modern nor tradi-
tional; it is in a stage in-between – hence the
transitional state. In such a state, the role of
the ‘core elites’ in the decision-making
process becomes indispensable to an extent
that the state and the rulers are considered
one and the same. Understanding these fea-
tures of the Arab state in my opinion is of im-
mense importance for the study of women’s
rights in the Arab world. For I argue that this
issue has become a subject of ‘negotiations’
from the very first day of the establishment of
the modern Arab state. 
On the one hand, the ‘personalities’ of those
who came to power, their ‘social and ideolog-
ical backgrounds’, and their ‘visions’ of a na-
tion-state, shaped to a great extent which
legal settings (secular or religious) the newly
established state will adopt in regulating the
issue of women’s rights. 
On the other hand, the question of which so-
cial group the political elites depended on to
retain power has been detrimental to state
policies towards women. Shifting these al-
liances in the Arab’s politics of survival, more-
over, has led sometimes to an equally
remarkable shift in these policies. The results
of this project will be published in a book in
2009; but the approach developed as a result
of its findings can be applied on other Arab
countries. 
In this paper I will use the case of the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia to highlight some ele-
ments of this argument. Given the diverse
aspects of the above mentioned approach,
and for the lack of enough space, I will only
focus on the Saudi state’s traditional base of
power, which social groups it depends on to
retain power, and how this had a direct bear-
ing on the situation of Saudi women. 
The paper will first describe the situation of
women in Saudi Arabia based on the latest in-
ternational and Saudi human rights reports; it
will then move to delineate state’s base of
power, its dependence on sectarian and tribal
groups, and show how this dependence not
only reflects negatively on the situation of
women’s rights in the Kingdom and ties the
hands of the political establishment on how far
it could introduce ‘reforms’ in this field. It sug-
gests that this dependence serves the pur-
pose of perpetuating the social structure
necessary for the survival of the Saudi regime. 
I. Conditions of Women in Saudi Arabia
The first sentence that comes to mind and has
been often used to describe the situation of
women in the Kingdom is too familiar: ‘women
are deprived of the right to drive a car’. Saudi
Arabia is the only country in the world that out-
laws this right. And yes, depriving a woman of
the right to drive serves the purpose of con-
trolling her physical mobility and hence less-
ening her independence. But focusing on the
right to drive misses the whole spectrum of
the issue. 
The title of the latest report of Human Rights
Watch about women’s conditions in Saudi
Arabia, published in April 2008, shed the light
on the core of the gender issue in the King-
dom: “Perpetual Minors: Human rights
Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship
and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia”.9
Women in the Kingdom, the report maintains,
are systematically treated as perpetual minors
through a system instituted by the state that
infringes on their basic human rights. 
Hence, “The Saudi government has instituted
a system whereby every Saudi woman must
have a male guardian, normally a father or
husband, who is tasked with making a range
of critical decisions on her behalf. This policy,
grounded in the most restrictive interpretation
of an ambiguous Quranic verse, is the most
significant impediment to the realization of
women’s rights in the kingdom. The Saudi au-
thorities essentially treat adult women like
legal minors who are entitled to little authority
over their own lives and well-being”.10
In other words, every adult Saudi woman, re-
gardless of her economic or social status,
must obtain permission from her male
guardian to work, travel, study, seek medical
treatment, or marry. She is also deprived from
making the most trivial decisions on behalf of
her children. This system is supported by the
imposition of complete sex segregation which
prevents women from participating meaning-
fully in public life. 
Sex segregation is strictly monitored by the
government’s Commission for the Promotion
of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (the reli-
gious police) in all workplaces with the excep-
tion of hospitals. Unlawful mixing between
sexes leads to the arrest of the violators and
criminal charges.11 The brutality of the mem-
17
9 Human Rights Watch, “Perpetual Minors: Human rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Ara-
bia”, New York, 2008. 
10 Ibid, page 2.
11 Ibid, pp. 2-3; p. 11; p. 14. 
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bers of this Commission and the unequal pun-
ishments men and women receive when com-
mitting the same ‘crime of mixing’ was best
described by the Saudi writer Samar al-
Muqren in her novel ‘Ni’saa al Munkar –
Women of  the Abominable“, published in
2008,  which she wrote based on her work as
a journalist.12
The ramifications of this system of male
guardianship and sex segregation are felt by
Saudi women in their daily lives. In the field of
education, the general framework of educa-
tion is tailored to reinforce discriminatory gen-
der roles and what the authorities consider as
suitable to ‘women’s nature and future role as
wives and mothers’. 
In addition, women’s and girls’ access to 
education depends on the good will of male
guardians, whose permission is essential for
their educational enrollment. Sex segregation
undermines women’s right to equality in edu-
cation especially when female university and
professors are often relegated to unequal fa-
cilities with unequal academic opportunities.13
In the field of employment, the Saudi Labor
Code, which came into force in 2006, re-
peated a former stipulation decreeing that in
line with article 4 of the Code, which requires
adherence to Sharia, ‘women shall work in all
fields suitable to their nature’ (article 149). The
result is that Saudi women continue to be
marginalized almost to the point of total exclu-
sion from the Saudi force. 
As said before, their participation in the Saudi
labor force does not exceed 4%. Complicating
the matter, both public and private sector re-
quire female staff to obtain the permission of
a male guardian to be hired, and employers
can fire a woman or force her to resign ‘if her
guardian decides for any reason that he no
longer wants her to work outside the home’.14
Male guardianship system jeopardizes Saudi
women’s fundamental right to health. 
Depending on the religious orientation of
those working in hospitals, health officials may
require guardian’s permission for a woman to
be ‘admitted, discharged, or to administer a
medical procedure on her or her children’.15
Women under this system are denied their
legal capacities, rendering them unable to
make decisions for themselves. And as legal
minors their ability to access and engage with
the courts and the government is severely
constrained without a guardian.
Some of these limitations border on absurdity;
mostly they have grave consequences. For in-
stance, women were granted on 2001 the
right to an independent identification card; yet
this right, which is optional, still requires a
guardian’s permission to be granted.
More gravely, it is nearly impossible for victims
of domestic violence to independently seek
protection or obtain legal redress because the
police often insist that women and girls obtain
their guardian’s authorization to file a criminal
complaint, even when this complaint is
against the guardian.16
Finally, Saudi Arabia applies a personal law
system based on the Hanbali School of Is-
lamic Jurisprudence, the most strict and literal
among the Sunni schools of jurisprudence.
The result of which is that a male guardian
has the unilateral authority to marry off his fe-
male ward without her consultation and to dis-
solve a marriage he deems unfit.17
Given the effects of this system of guardian-
ship and segregation on women’s lives, it
comes as no surprise that the United Nations
ranked Saudi Arabia 74th out of 75th countries
with respect to gender empowerment in the
year 2004;18 and that Saudi women activists
have been most vocal against this system in
their Shadow Report prepared for the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women CEDAW in its fortieth ses-
sion, 2008. This principle of “imposing the
guardianship of a male over the woman all her
life in Saudi Arabia”, they argued, is “linked to
the inferior look to women and her traditional
role in society and family”.19
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women picked on the
same issue and specifically called on Saudi
Arabia “to take immediate steps to end the
practice of male guardianship over women…
and to put into place without delay a compre-
hensive strategy … to modify or eliminate
negative cultural practices and stereotypes
that are harmful to and discriminate against
women and to promote women’s full enjoy-
ment of their human rights (…)”.20
I.1 Saudi Official response to International and
Local Criticism 
The official Saudi response to international
and local criticism to its imposition of the sys-
tem of male guardianship and segregation
12 Al-Muqren, Samar, Ni’saa al Munkar – Women of the Abominable, in Arabic, Second edition, Beirut: Dar Al Saqi, 2008.
03 Human Rights Watch, op., cit, pp. 14-15. 
14 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
15 Ibid., p. 20.
16 Ibid., pp. 22-25. 
17 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
18 Ibid., p 17. 
19 The Shadow Report for CEDAW, prepared by Saudi Women for Reform, December 2007, p. 1. 
20 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women”, Fortieth session, 14 January-1 February 2008, CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2, pp. 3-4. 
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moves along three lines of arguments. The
first is outright denial that there is a gender
problem to tackle with in the first place. 
In a response to the Human Rights Watch’s
report and the loud voices of Saudi women
activists, the Saudi Interior Minister Prince
Naif bin Abd al- Aziz issued a press statement
where he insisted that “the Saudi woman
since the beginning of Islam and since the
building of national unity (creation of the Saudi
Kingdom in 1932) has been receiving her
Sharia legal rights. (…) The Saudi society re-
spects the woman, for she is the mother, the
sister, the daughter, and the wife and she is
honored in everything”.21
The second line of argument used by Saudi
officials to counter international criticism high-
lights the positive ‘rights’ women enjoy under
the Sharia legal rights (such as the legal ca-
pacity to own and manage property), argues
that the Saudi concept of ‘Islamic human
rights” are compatible with those of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, insists that ‘rights’ in Islam are ‘legal
orders’, stresses the ‘cultural differences’ be-
tween societies and thus calls for ‘cultural
relativism’ when dealing with this issue. 
The official Statement of the Saudi Delegation 
to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women in its fortieth
session, 2008, is an exemplar of this type of
argument.22
The third line of official argument acknowl-
edges that there is a problem but argues that
the society is not ready for the required gen-
der reforms. Senior officials told researchers
who produced the Human Rights Watch’s re-
port that “the Kingdom needed to wait for so-
ciety to accept the notion of women’s rights
before the government could reform laws and
policies in this area”.23
Along this line, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al-Faisal said: ”Any decision that does
not break the social fabric we will take. We are
very much sensitive to the social cohesion of
the country. We are a new country where so-
cial cohesion is very important”.24 Saudi Ara-
bia is indeed a new country, and the newness
of its state has certainly contributed to the
conditions of women, but perhaps not in the
same sense Prince Saud al-Faisal has meant.
II. Saudi State’s Traditional Base of Power
Historians and area experts alike refer to the
establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
as the outcome of a historical ‘holy alliance’
between a dynastic leader Mohammed ibn
Saud and a religious preacher Mohammed
ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The former was the
founder of the Saudi dynasty and an amir of a
small town close to Riyadh called al-Dir’iyya,
and the latter was the founder of the orthodox
Wahhabi Sunni movement, based on the
Hanbali School of Jurisprudence, which advo-
cates for the strict practice of and absolute
obedience to Islam as interpreted by him. The
pledge the two men made in 1744 had the aim
of creating a state according to Wahhabi prin-
ciples. The state they created in the eigh-
teenth century was short-lived though. The
Ottomans, considering the Saudis a serious
threat to their interests in the region, launched
an aggressive military campaign, led by
Ibrahim Basha of Egypt, and managed to dis-
mantle the first Saudi kingdom. Nevertheless,
the same pledge was made by Ibn Saud – the
grandson of Mohammed ibn Saud - a century
and a half later, and provided the foundation
of today’s Saudi Arabia, created officially in
1932.25
Why this alliance was necessary in the first
place highlights the traditional base of power
upon which the Saudi state was founded - a
base, I argue, that was responsible for setting
of the parameters governing the lives of
women in the Kingdom. Mohammed ibn Abd
al-Wahhab was in need of a political figure
that can help him implement his ‘reading’ of
Islam in reality. 
His was a vision of a state ruled by the tenets
of the Wahhabiyya. Mohammed ibn Saud, on
the other hand, was in need of something
else. He needed a source of legitimacy that
compensates for his lack of authority. In short,
he lacked the proper ‘tribal lineage’ necessary
in his region, Najd, for leadership. 
Madawi al-Rasheed remarked in her book A
History of Saudi Arabia that the tribal descent
of Al Saud has not been confirmed though it
has often been attributed to the Masalikh of
Banu Wa’il - a tribal section of the north Arabia
camel-herding Aniza tribe. 
She contends that this association remains
suspicious and unconfirmed given that no his-
torical source suggests that this tribal section
played a role in Saudi later expansion in Ara-
bia. Saudi leadership, al-Rasheed concluded,
was lacking therefore in two respects:
First, it lacked an identifiable tribal ori-
gin that would have guaranteed a
21 Al-Qahtani, Ali, “Prince Naif: Liar who claims that women’s rights are aggrieved in our country”, in Arabic, Al-Watan Newspaper, 12th May,
2008.
22 Statement of the Saudi Delegation to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in Arabic, Fortieth session,
14th January-1st February 2008. 
23 Human Rights Watch, op.cit., p. 4. 
24 Ibid., p. 9. 
25 See Manea, Elham, Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, London: Saqi, 2005, pp. 21-22;  pp. 73-74.
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strong association with a tribal confed-
eration (...). Second Saudi leadership
lacked any great surplus of wealth (…)
Their commercial interests at that time
were not developed enough to ensure
an income sufficiently substantial to en-
able them to expand their authority over
other settlements or control large net-
works of caravan routes.26
Only when Mohammad ibn Saud embraced
the Wahhabi movement was he able to ex-
tend his authority outside the small town of al-
Dir’iyya. In other words, the alliance helped
him compensate for his lack of tribal origin
and wealth. His grand grandson Ibn Saud - in-
tent a century and half later on creating a king-
dom that exceeds the boundary of the Najd
region - needed the alliance with the Wahhabi
establishment for an additional reason. 
Faced with the continuous prospect of rebel-
lion of the Najdi Bedouin tribes, well-known for
their readiness to join the enemy just when
they were most needed, Ibn Saud saw the
‘driving’ and ‘taming’ potential of the Wah-
habiyya, which could enable him to settle and
create alliances with the Bedouin tribes of
Najd. In essence Ibn Saud exploited two fea-
tures of his setting to the advantage of his ter-
ritorial campaigns:
The Bedouin warfare customs: The harsh en-
vironment of the desert and the scarcity of re-
sources in the Najd region led to strong
competition between the tribes, so that con-
stant warfare became the norm. 
One important tenet of Wahhabism was its
emphasis on the duty of ‘every male Muslim’
to launch Jihad (holy war) to spread the tenets
of Wahhabism and fight those who refused to
accept it. In a sense, it is not surprising that
the Wahhabiyya sprang of the Najdi environ-
ment, for its strict and literal interpretation of
Islam matched its harsh desert environment;
and tribal warfare was substituted with a ‘Ji-
hadi’ campaign. 
Hence, the missionaries sent by Ibn Saud to
tribesmen to join the sect found a receptive
audience to this canvassing. Wahhabism pro-
vided them with a ‘definite directional ten-
dency’ – i.e. channeling their Bedouin warfare
drive into a religious ‘holy war’. 27
The “obedience’ tenet of Wahhabism: Wah-
habism is based on the doctrine that “power is
legitimate however it may have been seized,
and that obedience to whoever wields this
power is incumbent upon all his subjects”.
This requires ‘obedience to the wali al-amr,
leader of the Muslim community’, ‘readiness
to pay him zakat - alms, and respond to his
call for Jihad’.28
From a political perspective, this doctrine was
of immense importance to Ibn Saud. It al-
lowed him to tame and subdue the rebellious
Najdi Bedouin tribes, and demand that they
obey him as their leader. 
The Saudi alliance with the Wahhabi move-
ment, in short, offered the dynasty a clearly
defined religious mission which contributed
considerably to its leadership and legitimized
its authority. And the very nature of this al-
liance shaped to a great extent the type of po-
litical system that emerged, based on the two
pillars of the Saudi family and the Wahhabi re-
ligious establishment. However, this alliance
would not have materialized without the tribes
of the Najd and their readiness to provide the
manpower necessary for the territorial cam-
paigns launched by Ibn Saud starting from
1902 - constituting consequently the third pil-
lar of the Saudi political system. 
The political system that emerged after the es-
tablishment of the Kingdom state in 1932 was
therefore based on the supremacy of the Najd
region over the other regions conquered dur-
ing the campaign, and the instituting of Wah-
habi interpretation of Islam as the official
‘religion’ of the state. 
This political and cultural ‘uniformity’ masked
a reality of diversity within the Kingdom. Di-
versity is manifested in regional and sectarian
divisions. In addition to the Najd region, lo-
cated at the heart of the kingdom, Saudi Ara-
bia consists of three other regions. 
Hijaz, home to the Islamic holy sites, was his-
torically tied into the Ottoman bureaucratic
system, and is located at the Western side of
the Kingdom. Its population, infused for cen-
turies by descendants of foreign Muslims who
came as pilgrims and stayed on, follows the
Sunni Shafi’i School of Jurisprudence, or well
established Sufi orders. 29
The Eastern Province, contains the bulk of the
kingdom’s oil reserves, and is home of most of
the country’s minority population of the
Twelvers Shia - the same community to which
the Shia of Iran and Bahrain follow. However,
the majority of the Shia of this region follows
and emulates the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani of Najaf. Sunni Muslims living in the
Eastern part belong to Shafi’i School of Ju-
26 Al Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 16
27 Manea, Elham, op.cit, p. 74. 
28 Al-Rasheed, Madawi,  p. 51-52.
29 Manea, Elham, op.cit. p. 80.
20 ORIENT II / 2008
The Arab State and Women’s Rights:The Case of Saudi Arabia
risprudence. Like the Hijaz, this region was
ruled at some periods by the Ottoman admin-
istration. Finally Asir and Najran, located at
South of the Kingdom, is tied to Yemen both
historically and geographically, and has a pop-
ulation of Shiite Ismailis tribes.30
Masking this diversity and perpetuating the
hegemony of the Najd region, Wahhabi inter-
pretation of Islam over other denominations,
and the rule of the Saudi dynasty were, in my
opinion, facilitated by the Saudi official policy
of discrimination towards women. As a matter
or fact, I argue that the very principles of male
guardianship and obedience imposed on
women in the Kingdom are serving the pur-
pose of maintaining the social structure nec-
essary for the survival of the Saudi regime. In
the next part I will discuss this assumption. 
III. The Saudi State and Women’s Rights: The
Benefits of “Obedience” 
The alliance between the Saudi family and the
religious establishment continues today. In re-
turn for their control over domestic life in the
kingdom, their control of religious institutions,
and key positions in the government, including
justice and the educational system, as well as
various other privileges and rewards, the reli-
gious leaders ensure the legitimacy of the
Saudi regime. They also provide religious jus-
tification for highly sensitive political decisions
and conveniently ignore the excesses of the
Saudi family.31
Given this division of roles, it was no coinci-
dence that the rules governing women’s lives
were shaped by the perception of the Wah-
habi religious establishment. The assumption
of this paper is that the Saudi royal family may
be indifferent to the question of women, but
the religious establishment is not. Women
subordination to men is integral to its world
view. On the other hand, both, the royal family
and the religious establishment, has an inter-
est in keeping the family structures as they
are. Saudi Kings have been less inclined to
take positions that revealed outright rejection
to women’s participation in the society. As a
matter of fact, while their positions fluctuated
between cautious liberalism and deep conser-
vatism (depending on the personality of the
King himself), as a rule, they have often taken
steps to ease the restrictions imposed on
women. These steps have never exceeded a
certain boundary though - the boundary set
by the religious establishment. 
For example, it was King Faisal (r. 1964-1975)
serving as a prime minister at the time who
decided with a royal decree issued in 1959 to
establish girls’ schools for the first time in the
history of the Kingdom. Prior to that date, girls
used to learn reading and writing and reciting
Quran in religious small classes called
Katatib. These Katatib used to teach boys and
girls together in the Eastern Part while girls
were taught segregated in the Najd region.32
The decision was faced with violent protest by
conservative religious forces to the extent that
girls had to be accompanied by members of
the National Guard to the newly opened
schools. King Faisal strong personality and
his mother’s blood relationship with the al-
Sheikh family (the family of Mohammed ibn
Abd al-Wahhab) enabled him to face up to the
pressure of the religious establishment. 
Yet he did not hesitate afterwards to entrust
the religious establishment with the supervi-
sion of female education, allowing them in fact
to dictate the substance of the education
given to girls. As a result, the first objective of
the Saudi Female Education Program is “to
give girls a clear understanding of their re-
sponsibilities towards their children, their own
home, and society”. 33
Likewise, the reforms promised by King Ab-
dullah (r. since 2005), who has positioned
himself prior to the death of his brother King
Fahd as a supporter of ‘cautious reforms’,
these reforms remained to a great extent un-
heeded. One of the steps that he decreed in
30 Interview through the Internet with Wajeha Al Huwaider, a leading Saudi Women Activist, June, 2008; Manea, Elham, op.cit.
31 Manea, Elham, op. cit., p. 75. The Wahhabi religious establishment is made of ulama. The term ulama in its wider sense is used to refer
to recognized religious scholars: judges (qadis), imams (preachers), religious lawyers, religious teachers, etc. These likely numbered
well over 10,000 in the 1980s, according to Abir Mordechai and others; this number must have increased since, with three Islamic uni-
versities producing several thousand graduates annually. I use the term to refer to the most senior religious scholars and the leaders
of the religious establishment. They include the twenty five members of the Council of the Assembly of Senior Ulama, a council estab-
lished in 1971 by King Faisal to promote regular consultation between the monarch and the religious establishment. They also include
members of religious institutions such as the Higher Council of Qadis, the Institute for Scientific Study, the Bureau of Religio-Legal Opin-
ion and the Supervision of Religious affairs etc. Also among the ulama are members of the influential Al al-Sheikh family, the descendants
of the founder of Wahhabism–Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Their power and influence was even stronger given the fact that Ibn Saud
and his sons have intermarried with the Al al-Sheikh family. Manea, Elham, Note 18, p. 167. 
32 Interview with Wajeha Al Huwaider, op., cit, Al Harbiy, Bint Mukhalad,Dalal, Famous Women of Nejd, in Arabic, Riyadh: Dar King Abd
Al Aziz, 1998, p. 146.
33 Mona Al Munajjed, Women in Saudi Arabia Today, Britain: Macmillan Press, 1997, p.67; Prokop, Michaela, “The War of Ideas: Education
in Saudi Arabia”, in Aarts, Paul & Nonneman, Gerd (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, Lon-
don: Hurst & Company, 2005,  p. 63; Al Yousef, Nora, “The Privacy of Saudi Woman”, in Arabic, Al Watan Newspaper,  23ed June, 2004;
Manea, Elham, pp. 74-75. 
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his capacity as a Crown Prince was the dedi-
cation of the Third National Meeting for Dia-
logue, which took place in Jeddah in June
2004, to the situation of women in the King-
dom. The aim of the meeting was to discuss
the discrimination endured by women and
suggest solutions that can reform their condi-
tion. Despite the participation of women ac-
tivists and liberal reformers in the Forum, it
was the conservatives and the representa-
tives of the religious establishment who dic-
tated the terms of the meeting and wrote the
‘toothless’ recommendations issued at the
conclusion of the forum. Several Saudi news
reports indicated that the reformers rejected
the recommendations, but “were forced to en-
dorse them”. 34
As these two examples demonstrate, it is safe
to argue that Saudi leaders have often tried to
introduce some measures of improvement to
alleviate the situation of women, yet con-
stantly and very tellingly they relented and let
the religious establishment dictate the sub-
stance of these measures. 
The religious establishment, on the other
hand, has always been clear about its percep-
tion of where a woman should belong. Its
world view towards women is exemplified by
a book entitled The Happiest Woman in the
World written by Aiedh Algarni - a famous
Wahhabi preacher. Its message was simple:
The happiest woman in the world is a woman
who fulfills her Sunni/Wahhabi Islamic reli-
gious duties, stays home, does not mix with
men, takes care of her family, be patient, do
not get angry, and makes sure that her hus-
band is satisfied with her.35 One indication
supporting this opinion is how a woman
should do everything she can to please her
husband. If she wants to guarantee her hap-
piness in the afterlife, she has to ensure her
husband’s satisfaction with her in this life!  
“Do you not  know that if a husband be-
came angry with his wife, she will be
cursed in the Old Testament, the Bible,
al Zabour, and the Quran; she will suf-
fer when she dies, and her grave will
become narrow. Oh, blessed is a
woman whose husband is satisfied with
her (sic!).” 36
Obedience to man is necessary according to
this view “because God has created the man
stronger than the woman in his endurance,
mind, and physical strength; and created the
woman emotional, impassionate, lacking the
physical energy a man has, and she is to a
certain extent moody than he is; this is why
the house is her place. And the woman who
loves her husband and children does not
leave her home without a reason, and she
never mixes with men (sic!).”37
Woman’s subordination to man is thus integral
to the world view of the Wahhabi religious es-
tablishment. Nevertheless, while this religious
establishment’s perception may differ from
that of the royal leaders towards the role of
women and the limits imposed on her, both
have an interest in keeping the family struc-
ture as it is. 
Both the Saudi Leaders and the Wahhabi es-
tablishment have an interest in a hierarchical
family structure, where the values of obedi-
ence are instilled and cherished. Both have
an interest in family laws that are compatible
with the tribal structure of the Najdi society.
And both have an interest in prohibiting inter-
tribal/regional and inter-sectarian marriages.
Simply put, controlling women’s civil and legal
lives through the institution of male guardian-
ship serves the purpose of keeping the su-
premacy of the Najd region in the Kingdom –
the power base of the Saudi dynasty. 
III.1. Obedience
As I said elsewhere the principle of obedience
in the Wahhabi teaching has been instrumen-
talized politically by the Saudi dynasty in their
Najdi region, as the survival of the new state
has depended on it. The same can be said
today. Without instilling obedience, the diverse
populations of the different regions and Is-
lamic denominations of the Kingdom are
bound to rebel. The sectarian fanaticism of the
Wahhabi establishment and its denounce-
ment of other Islamic denominations and cur-
rents as ‘deviant’ at best or ‘heretic’ at worse,
have given fuel to simmering resentment and
dissatisfaction of the majority of the Kingdom’s
population. Obedience is therefore necessary
for the survival of the Saudi political system;
and it is no wonder that government considers
it a virtue and a duty in its official documents. 
For example article 9 of the Saudi Basic Law,
issued in January 1992, clearly declared that:
“The family is the nucleus of Saudi so-
ciety. Its members shall be brought up
imbued with the Islamic Creed which
34 Alzayd, Ali and others, “Disputes disrupt the Discussion of the Recommendations and lead to unknown results for the Third Meeting of
the National Dialogue”, In Arabic, Al Watan Newspaper, 15th June, 2004. 
35 Algarni, Aiedh, The Happiest Woman in the World, in Arabic, Seventh Edition, Beirut: Alrayan, 2005. 
36 Ibid, p. 110. 
37 Ibid. 
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calls for obedience to God, His Mes-
senger and those of the nation who are
charged with authority.” 
The principle of obedience has been instilled
in society through the Saudi educational pol-
icy. Schoolbooks consistently stress obedi-
ence as an important duty of the citizens, and
maintain that obedience has several levels. It
starts with obedience to the head of the family,
the father, and then moves to obedience to
the rulers and religious authorities. 
Failure to ‘obey’ is equated with trying to cre-
ate ‘fitna’, or dissension - an accusation often
used to discredit those who criticize the
regime.38 A women’s obedience to her hus-
band is part of this hierarchal social order.  It
is the first block of a strictly controlled social
structure. 
III.2. Male Guardianship 
By the same token, male guardianship over
women is instrumental in preventing inter-
tribal/regional and inter-sectarian marriages.
Two recent cases of ‘forced divorce’ given
high profile in Saudi press illustrate my point.39
The first case concerns the forced divorce of
a 34-year-old Fatima `Azzaz from Mansour al-
Timani. Fatima `Azzaz’s half-brothers took
legal action following the death of their father,
claiming that Mansour had misrepresented his
tribal affiliation when he asked for permission
to marry Fatima, and that he in fact belong to
a tribe lower genealogically than theirs. While
Fatima informed the judge at a court in the
northern city of Juf that she wanted to remain
married, he ruled in favor of the brothers and
ordered the divorce in August 2005. Fatima
remains to date imprisoned with her children
for rejecting the court verdict.  
The second case concerns the forced divorce
of Laila bent Muhammad Fayez Assiri (who is
Sunni) from her husband Ala Allah bin Hassan
bin Fnis al-Fnis (who is Shiiti/Ismaeli) in the
Asir region. Despite her father’s consent to
the marriage, a Judge passed a sentence in
April 2006 ending their marriage of one year
because of their sectarian difference. 
The sentence is based on many Wahhabi re-
ligious edicts that prohibit inter-sectarian mar-
riage. One such edict is that of Sheik
Muhammad Bin Ibrahim al-Asheikh, which
states ‘the (marriage) contract is invalid for the
reason of religious incompetence since Shi-
ites are not as competent as Sunnis’.
The two cases highlight a fact that is starting
only lately to come to light. Marriage among
Saudis has been done along tribal and sec-
tarian lines. A woman can only marry a man
from a suitable tribal line and who belongs to
the same religious denomination. Crossing
these social boundaries is very rare.40
If a woman decided to break these ‘rules’, as
Fatima in the first case did, her male guardian
has the right to ask for the dissolvent of the
marriage, and his wish will be granted. And in
cases where the families decide that the sec-
tarian differences are of no importance, the
religious authority takes it upon itself to inter-
fere, as it did in the second case, and annuls
inter-sectarian marriages. In other words, the
regional and sectarian divisions of the King-
dom are being perpetuated through a control
system, which gives the ultimate authority to
the male guardians and the Wahhabi estab-
lishment. 
These marriage rules, I repeat, are instrumen-
tal in preserving the hegemony of the Najd re-
gion in the Kingdom, for they have kept its
tribal lineage intact and prevented its mem-
bers from intermarrying from other regions.
Mai Yamani remarked in her book Cradle of
Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian
Identity, that the Hijazi marriages were in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
more flexible and did not pay much attention
to ‘origins’. Being a Muslim regardless of ori-
gin provided a sufficiently strong basis on
which to enter a marriage. This openness,
however, had changed after the establishment
of the Kingdom and was replaced with strict
rules to match those of the Najdi. 
She observes that “Najdi marriage was, and
remains within the same lineage, with bonds
among the tribal families usually reinforced by
patrilineal parallel-cousin marriages.” But she
stresses that a distinction should be made be-
tween khadiri (non- tribal, i.e.’ non pure’ Najdi),
and gabili (tribal ‘pure-blooded’ Najdi).
She maintains that “this strict patrilinearity al-
lowed gabili to marry outsiders, such as
Egyptian.., but their female relatives have
never married outside the tribe. In principle,
then, men from the Hijaz would not have been
able to marry into a pure-blooded Najdi family,
while women would, although Hijazi women
were not, as a rule, given in marriage to Najdi
families, nor were they asked”.41
Yamani comes to the conclusion that “mar-
riages between Hijazis and Najdis are very
rare. (…) [and] that Najdis do not marry Hi-
jazis because their linage is not considered
pure enough. (…) The rarity of cases of inter-
38 Prokop, Michaela, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
39 Human Rights Watch, op. cit., pp, 30-31; The Shadow Report for CEDAW, p. 13-14. 
40 Interview with Wajeha al Huwaider, op.cit. 
41 Yamani, Mai, Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the quest for an Arabian Identity, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 80-81. 
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marriages… is the most significant expression
of the social boundaries between the regions
of Saudi Arabia..(M)arriage practices and al-
liances demonstrate the fractured nature of
the Saudi state.”42
IV. Conclusion
In a society where its members of different
tribal/regional/sectarian origins are not al-
lowed to inter-marry, division is the norm to be
expected. When a state institutionalizes these
social barriers to the advantage of one social
group, it conveys a message that it does not
represent all of its citizens. Citizenship ceases
to have the relevant connotation expected,
and therefore a national identity does not
exist. Not really. A citizen in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia is first and foremost a member of
a ‘tribe’, a ‘region’, and most importantly a ‘re-
ligious denomination’. 
The Saudi system of male guardianship and
marriage rules, while blatantly discriminatory
against women, serves a political purpose:
perpetuating the social structure that pre-
serves these tribal/regional/sectarian divi-
sions. The end result has been keeping the
Nadjis from inter-marrying from other regions
and preventing sectarian mixed marriage.
Simply put, it helped keeping the Saudi
regime’s base of power socially intact. This
can explain why despite their attempts to im-
prove the gender situation, the hands of the
Saudi rulers have remained tied. 
Every time they have tried to introduce some
measure of reforms, the Wahhabi religious es-
tablishment interfere either to stop the reforms
all together or worse to dictate their terms.
The rulers set the measure but the religious
establishment decides both its boundaries
and substance. 
A serious reform of the gender situation in
Saudi Arabia entails no less than a change of
the power equation in the Saudi political sys-
tem. Change the dependence of the Saudi dy-
nasty on the Wahhabi religious establishment
and the Najd region, and you may as well
change the face of the Kingdom itself. But as
long as its legitimacy is grounded on the two,
there will be limits to the reforms possible in
the Kingdom. 
The case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia re-
veals the political nature of the gender issue in
many Arab countries. 
The question which social group the political
elites decides to ally itself with and bases its
power on, determines the type of laws and
policies it will adopt towards women. Because
many Arab states have tended to ally them-
selves with conservative and traditional social
groups, they have been reluctant to modern-
ize their family laws. Religious stipulations
governing the family sphere were and still are
therefore relevant. 
The Saudi case is the most extreme among
Arab states in terms of the negative conse-
quences women have to endure as a result. It
is also the most extreme in terms of the mag-
nitude of violations committed against women. 
42 Ibid., p. 85. 
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